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Electoral Politics, Multi-partism and the Quest for Political 





Following the coming into power of the EPRDF (Ethiopian People‘s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front) in 1991, several political organizations took part 
in the political process in Ethiopia that promised a multi-party system. Although 
general elections in which several political organizations took part were held in 
1995, the May 2005 elections provided an opportunity for the people to participate 
in the elections en masse. This paper argues that while the EPRDF indulged in the 
rhetoric of multi-party politics before the 2005 election, its crackdown in the 
aftermath of the same, its claims of total victory in 2010 and 2015 elections, and 
the politics of antagonism it has been persistently pursuing exposed the regime‘s 
lack of commitment in multi-party elections as an important aspect of democratic 
politics. Secondly while the protests of 2014-2017 and the subsequent initiatives 
on the part of the government since have rekindled hope for democratic 
engagement, uncertainties remain. By using state-society relations as framework of 
analyses and reviewing secondary sources – books, articles, reports and web 
sources – this article makes a critical reflection on multi-party political rhetoric, 
the consequences of political control and repression, the significance of the 
concept of political community for political transformation in general and the 
conduct of genuine multi-party elections in the country in particular in the future. 
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In 1991 the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) led Ethiopian People‘s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) with its allies, toppled the military-
socialist regime commonly known as the Derg (1974-1991) and went onto 
configuring its relationships with the various categories of the Ethiopian people. 
One of the major political developments in Ethiopia since then was the 
introduction of multi-party political dispensations, which was generally new in 
Ethiopia at that time. There was no scope for multi-party elections during the 
monarchical period in Ethiopia (Arriola, 2005). A nominal one-party election was 
held under the Derg‘s Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) for the formation of the 
Biherawi Shengo (national assembly or council) in 1987. 
        In the post 1991 period, the EPRDF regime, with encouragement of its 
external allies arguably helped the introduction of multiparty politics. The EPRDF 
invited several political organizations calling themselves ‗fronts‘, 'parties', 'forces' 
or 'movements', etc., to participate in what was called the Transitional National 
Conference convened in Addis Ababa in July 1991. The Conference created the 
87-seat Council of Representatives that served as a ‗parliament‘ during the 
transitional period (1991-1995). About 30 political groups or organizations took 
part in the Conference (Vaughan, 1994). The EPRDF-led Transitional Government 
of Ethiopia (TGE) was established with representatives from the EPRDF and other 
political groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) at that time. The 
Transitional Period Charter served as a framework for a nominal election, to the 
exclusion of groups such as the OLF, was held in 1992 for the formation of 
―regional assemblies‖ (Lyons, 2010). 
During the transitional period, old and newly formed political 
organizations wanted to take advantage of the democratization dispensations that 
seemed to promise multi-party electoral competition. Since then, political 
organizations continued to emerge or merge or in some cases disappear from the 
Ethiopian political scene. Another election, for the formation of the ―constituent 
assembly‖ was held in 1994, allowing the EPRDF to maintain absolute majority of 
the assembly. After adopting the 1995 constitution, different political organizations 
participated in what was considered the ‗first general elections‘ held in May 1995. 
These elections, while they did not significantly contribute to the genuine 
democratization of the country, they may have helped in the legitimization of the 
TPLF dominated EPRDF as the sole arbiter in the post 1991 political order, in the 
run up to the official proclamation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(FDRE). In these elections, the EPRDF and its affiliates claimed to have won in 
absolute majority dominating the political landscape (Lyons, 2010). 
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The second general elections were held in May 2000. The EPRDF allowed 
political organizations (‗opposition‘) outside state power to take part in the 
elections. Candidates of ‗opposition‘ groups were able to participate and compete 
in about half of the country‘s electoral districts in these elections. Financial 
capacity, harassment and intimidation by state functionaries especially at the local 
administration levels were cited as the major factors which impeded the political 
organizations and the candidates they fielded, in effectively competing with the 
EPRDF and its affiliates. Consequently, the EPRDF and its affiliates took the 
overwhelming majority of seats in the House of Peoples‘ Representatives 
(Pausewang & Tronvoll, 2000). 
The analyses in this paper focus on the rhetoric of multiparty elections in 
Ethiopia with a focus on the post 2005 period, raising other major issues, the 
EPRDF‘s mode of political mobilization and strategies of control of the 
population, that have not been conducive for the institutionalization of credible 
party system or multi-party politics and the conduct of genuine elections. It 
touches on popular protests (2014-2017), political reform initiative since 2018, the 
key challenges in the present context, and presents reflections on the significance 
of the concept of political community for the future transformation of political 
conditions in the country. In the next section the article discusses conceptual issues 
relating to multi-party politics, electoral politics or democracy, political 
community and state-society relations. The third part makes a critical assessment 
of the last three general elections (2005, 2010, 2015) in Ethiopia, as these form the 
―corpus‖ in the experience and rhetoric of multiparty elections for about a quarter 
of a century. The fourth section makes a critical analysis of the strategies of the 
EPRDF, its ambitions and practices of control of the political, economic and social 
life of the population, the nature of its relations with political organizations outside 
state power and the society more broadly, and the failure of the former in learning 
lessons for the genuine democratization and institutionalization of multi-party-
politics and the conduct of free and fair elections and beyond. The discussion then 
proceeds to the key challenges currently, following the reform initiatives since 
early 2018, and concludes with reflections on the quest for a viable political 
community for political transformation and meaningful political processes in 
which genuine elections will be held and challenging political issues may be 
resolved in Ethiopia in the future. 
 
Conceptual Clarifications 
The discussion in this part focuses on the clarification of major conceptual themes 





community and state-society relations. To begin with, party system in general, and 
multi-party in particular imply that there exist multiple and diverse interests in the 
society- the people constituting modern political communities, giving rise to or the 
formation of political organizations the primary roles of which are to identify, 
articulate, and aggregate the interests of groups and individual members of the 
society (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). These political organizations are formally 
called parties, and the notion of multi-party refers to the situation in which more 
than two parties function or compete in elections. In democratic political systems 
parties provide the platform to debate and articulate the demands and the interests 
of members of the society and develop them into political programs. A democratic 
system or democracy as Makinda suggests, is ―a way of government firmly rooted 
in the belief that people in any society should be free to determine their own 
political, economic, social, and cultural systems‖ (1996, p. 557). Similarly, a 
prominent scholar on Democracy, Dahl, maintains that,  
We interpret it as consisting of the rule by the people, or rather 
demos with a government of the state that is responsive and 
accountable to the demos, a sovereign authority that decides 
important political matters either directly in popular assemblies 
or indirectly through its representatives, chosen by lot or, in 
modern democracies, by means of elections. Viewing democracy 
from the second point of view, we interpret it as providing an 
extensive body of rights. These are of at least two kinds. One 
consists of rights, freedoms and opportunities that are essential to 
popular control and the functioning of the democratic institutions 
themselves, such as freedom of speech and assembly (2001, p. 
20). 
In a democratic system, people periodically and regularly elect their 
leaders and representatives through the mechanism of free, fair and transparent 
elections. Elections play paramount role in providing opportunities for choosing 
the representatives of the people democratically, and serve as mechanism for 
peaceful transfer of power or change of government. Democracy understood in this 
sense, and when translated into practice, provides the necessary conditions in 
which political organizations or parties exist and compete for the votes of members 
of the political community or citizens, as basis of holding office for a limited 
period of time or term. It is a political order in which people (citizens) have their 
say in matters affecting them, actively participate and work to achieve and 
maintain control of the political system, thereby limiting the power of the 
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government they themselves make (Menocal, 2014). In a democratic political 
system, citizens have equal say in deciding on matters that affect them and that 
"opposition to currently prevailing policies is always legitimate" (Shapiro, 2001, p. 
211). 
In discussing multi-party politics and elections in general, what is of 
primary importance is not the nominal or formal existence of several political 
organizations, and the periodic conduct of elections. The mere existence of several 
political organizations may provide a system with a nominal presence of ‗party 
system‘ while it does not lend it credibility. Genuine multi-party elections take 
place within a democratic political system. Put differently, a democratic order in 
which political parties compete for the votes of citizens exists in practice when 
people are at liberty to express their ideas without fear, i.e., when freedom of 
expression, freedom of speech, assembly and association are realized, and the 
actual exercise of these freedoms could be served best in the presence of 
democratic institutions (Dahl, 1989). Empirical studies show the widening gap 
between the conceptual meaning of democracy as explained above and the 
divergent practices and controversies surrounding the various perspectives on 
multi-party politics or elections and the divergent practices in the present context. 
Nothing explains the divergences than the emergence of terms such as ―multi-party 
democracy‖ or ―electoral democracy‖ (Beer, 2001; Rothstein, 2009), ―electoral 
authoritarianism‖ (Kou & Kao, 2011; Shirah, 2016), ―hybrid regimes‖ (Boggards, 
2009), ―dominant party‖ system (Arian & Samuel, 1974; Boggards, 2004) in the 
literature on multi-party politics or elections. The implication here is that ―multi-
party democracy‖ or ―electoral democracy‖ does mean different things in different 
contexts.  
Here, the writer employed the term mutli-partism to indicate the 
circumstances in which the EPRDF regime and its proponents indulged in the 
rhetoric of multi-party politics that presented a less than genuine political process, 
presumably aimed at the democratization in Ethiopia since early 1990s. Multi-
partism here in this article is understood as rhetoric of multi-party politics and 
elections as different from meaningful or credible electoral discourses and 
practices. It refers to pretentious pronouncements of politicians engaging in 
various practices which allow political organizations to take part in elections that 
are not genuine or elections without integrity. The term electoral integrity gained 
considerable importance and being frequently cited following experiences of 
electoral fraud, malpractices or serious irregularities. The notion of electoral 
integrity maintains that, for an election to be meaningful, it has to fulfill the 





criteria of free and fair elections (Norris, 2015). With regard to this, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 21-3) underlines that "the will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of government expressed through periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held 
by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." Article 25 of the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights lists elements of free and fair 
elections- periodic elections at regular intervals, universal suffrage, one person one 
vote, the right to elect and to be elected, etc. It also mentions the term ―genuine‖ 
elections, which is frequently used in this paper. Genuine elections do not exist in a 
vacuum. Genuine elections take place in conditions where the political rule of the 
game allows the exercise of the free will of the people—citizen-members of 
political community. This is important because elections in many parts of the 
world have become pretentious (Blaydes, 2006) and it‘s baffling to see millions of 
people queuing on election days without the readiness on the part of those in 
command of state power to allow the conduct of free and fair election. It is the 
rhetoric and the ‗democratic pretensions‘ (Pausewang et al., 2002) described in this 
paper as multi-partism which captures the experience in Ethiopia. 
Another key concept in this paper is political community. Political 
community is a long standing concept in political theory, which does not seem to 
be given adequate attention in political analyses of recent times, however. At the 
most general level it denotes the notion that people in what are conventionally 
called states constitute a community the essence of which is political--hence 
political community--of shared political ideals, common destiny, and for the 
common good. In normative political theory, while the concept of political 
community may be closer to the concept of polity, it is different from the concept 
of the state dominating understandings in political and social sciences in the 
modern context (Linklater, 1998). While the state is an overarching institutional 
structure (Kalpokas, 2016), political community is the constitutive element, i.e. the 
body politic. Here what is important is not the fact of being in a state; it is rather 
the unity or solidarity - the will and the capacity of the people to stand together - 
the bond (Baker & Bartelson, 2009) which defines a political community and its 
viability. This means that the idea of political community transcends the ideas of 
state and nation (Husserl, 1939). Beyond formal belonging, political community 
presupposes the existence of meaningful sense of belonging and citizenship, such 
as life of dignity, the right to subsistence and security, freedom of association and 
expression, equality, the rule of law and justice. The understanding that the will 
and the capacity of the people to stand together under the rule of law, also serving 
as the guardian of the same, are critical elements in the conception of political 
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community. While there could be various ways of explaining the attributes of a 
political community, I would argue that dignity, freedom, solidarity, justice and the 
rule of law are among the major defining features or values of viable political 
communities. Therefore, for the purpose of the analyses in this paper, political 
community could be understood as a union of free people that have chosen to live 
under a political order for the purpose of their common economic, political and 
social wellbeing. Political community (ies), whose members are endowed with 
human dignity, freedom and solidarity, and sense of meaningful citizenship serves 
as the foundation of a well functioning state, legitimate government, and ultimately 
a political order in which the business of politics, including genuine elections, can 
be conducted in orderly and predictable manner.  
Finally, state-society relations is another concept briefly explained in this 
section of the paper. ‗State-Society‘ is analytical framework which denotes the 
‗relational‘ significance of state and society as higher categories of human 
association. The various aspects or elements constituting the categories of state and 
society interact in multiple forms. At the general level, the term ‗state-society‘ 
denotes relations that are antagonistic or complementary (Solomon, 2007). The 
writer argues that state-society relations in the post-Derg Ethiopia have been 
antagonistic. This can be explained by the fact that the interests of those at the 
helm of state power in the post 1991 period in Ethiopia diverged from the needs 
and aspirations of the various categories of the society, which among other 
consequences resulted in fear, fragmentation, and distrust within the population 
during this period (Solomon, 2007). Electoral politics, multi-partism and political 
community are employed here as points of reference being examined in state-
society relations of antagonisms characteristics of the situation in Ethiopia during 
the past decades. It could therefore be argued that antagonisms best expressed by 
the political rhetoric and practices of the repressive TPLF-EPRDF regime that 
opted to dominate or even aspired for the total control of the society (Aregawi, 
2008) diminished the chances of having genuine multi-party election.  
Beyond making multi-party politics a mockery, the more than a quarter of 
a century of EPRDF rule contributed to fear, fragmentation and disunity widely 
felt within the Ethiopian body politic in the post 1991 period. The predominant 
approach used in writing this report is document analysis. Several works relating to 
contemporary political developments in Ethiopia including electoral politics have 
been explored. A lot has been said about successive elections in Ethiopia. 
However, there is a need to review and provide a critical assessment about 
elections and multi-party political dispensations in Ethiopia in a manner capturing 





surrounding the conduct of general elections in the country so far, as well as by 
reflecting on the current dynamics and the challenges ahead. In doing so, books, 
journal articles, research reports and web resources have been explored. The next 
section discusses the rhetoric and practices of multi-party politics in Ethiopia with 
a focus on the general elections during 2005-2015 period. 
 
Multi-partism and Electoral Politics in Ethiopia (2005-2015) 
The May 2005 Elections were the ‗third general elections‘ which observers of 
contemporary political developments in Ethiopia have considered the most 
significant electoral event occurred in the country to date (Abbink, 2006). These 
elections, as Arriola observed, 
marked a significant evolution in the Ethiopia‘s political 
development, as the country transitioned from de facto single 
party system to a multiparty system. In a country with no history 
of democratic competition or peaceful alteration in power, it is 
no small feat that nearly a third of districts, if election results are 
accepted as they are, opted for the opposition over the EPRDF 
(2003, p. 137). 
First and foremost, the May 2005 elections appeared to have given a more 
credible opportunity to the people of the country to participate in the elections in 
record numbers. Perhaps for this first time in the country‘s history the Ethiopian 
people may have voted hoping that they may be able to change the government 
through a ballot box. Secondly, the May 2005 elections could be considered as one 
of the rare instances in which poorly organized political organizations
1
 outside 
state power mounted a considerable electoral challenge against the incumbent - the 
EPRDF that was bolstered by years of control of state power, empowered by 
access to state resources and manipulation of the political environment. Thirdly, 
the political context in the run up to the 2005 elections was comparably 
permissive, thereby allowing political organizations or the opponents of the ruling 
                                                          
1
 A few political organizations which posed formidable challenge against the incumbent 
EPRDF during the 2005 elections were organized in just a short period of time-in a few 
months before the elections. The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) were cases in point, where these organizations 
overwhelmed by the growing number of supporters were not able to convert the support 
into a coherent party membership, organization and discipline. 
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EPRDF to campaign relatively freely and openly. Consequently, unlike the 
previous elections, several political organizations campaigned actively in almost 
all parts of the country (Lyons, 2005). 
In general, the May 2005 elections took place in the context where the 
EPRDF regime allowed a relatively permissive political environment in the run-
up-to the elections. During the campaigns, live televised debates were held 
allowing the political organizations to present their positions and to debate 
publicly. The land issue, group rights vis-à-vis individual rights, poverty and 
economic development, governance, rule of law, foreign relations were the topics 
addressed during the debates. However much of the theatrics were conducted in 
the form of the choice between revolutionary democracy, which the EPRDF 
claimed to have firmly stood for, and ‗liberal democracy‘ arguably advocated by 
political groups such as the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) at that time. 
Moreover, the proceedings of the debates were indicative of the lack of agreement 
between the ruling EPRDF and its opponents on critical issues that were supposed 
to form the ‗organizing principles‘ of the Ethiopian body politic and its institutions 
since the 1990s (Abbink, 2006). 
On 15 May 2005 the elections took place where the turnout was estimated 
between 80% -90% of those registered to vote. The election day was recognized to 
have been largely peaceful. On 16 May 2005, the EPRDF announced that it won 
the general elections, but confirmed that it lost to the CUD all but one of the seats 
of the Addis Ababa City Council. Major disagreements ensued after the opposition 
groupings also started to claim victory countrywide. As events unfolded, it 
announced the ban on public demonstration. On 08 June 2005 street 
demonstrations took place in Addis Ababa and state security forces killed several 
people. Widespread protests and deaths and detentions were reported in the 
Oromia and Amhara regions in particular (Carter Center, 2009). 
The May 2005 elections also witnessed the involvement of a relatively 
large number of local and international election observers. The latter category 
consists of the African Union Election Observation Mission (AU), the Carter 
Center, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) and the 
Arab League. These observers, however, came up with divergent views in their 
reports. The AU Observers Mission claimed it confirmed that the elections were 
fair. The Carter Center on its part claimed that while there were irregularities, it did 
not reject the results. The EU-EOM‘s view, however, differed from the two 





Praise was given for the preliminary phase, the relatively free 
debate and campaigning, the technical preparations, and the 
voting process, but it was critical about the voting day practices 
and the selective intimidation of voters and opposition 
candidates. EU observers did not see the voting process in the 
large majority of the rural constituencies. They nevertheless did 
a commendable job, showing that the EU took its role of 
observer seriously (2006, p.12). 
The EPRDF government on its part responded to the reports, especially to 
reports of the EU mission in a hostile manner. After the official result was 
announced, the then Prime Minster of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi issued a series of 
statements published in the state owned English daily, the Ethiopian Herald of 29-
31 August 2005 editions. This was in response to the EU preliminary report, to 
ridicule the assertions of the Head of the Mission, Ms. Ana Gomes of the European 
Parliament. Overall what was considered a historic election turned out to be a 
tragic event, and it did undoubtedly left its mark on the processes and the outcomes 
of 2010 and 2015 elections. It sent a shock wave within the rank and file of the 
EPRDF regime looking at the figures, and raising questions as to whether they 
were ready to concede in an event of electoral defeat or a considerable lose in its 
control over the rugged Ethiopian political landscape. Consequently, the period 
between the 2005 and the 2010 elections was characterized by a series of measures 
the EPRDF took to recover from the shock of 2005 elections, the dramatic 
weakening of political organizations generally termed as ‗opposition‘, (Yemane, 
2010) and the repression unleashed against protestors, mainly students in Addis 
Ababa and Oromia regions of the country. The repressive measures forced the 
resignation of many people from actively participating in the political life of the 
country. Worse still, the EPRDF and its members or supporters openly went onto 
engage in practices which undermined the integrity of any future elections. 
Consequently, in the immediate aftermath of the May 2005 elections the EPRDF 
did not waste time to prepare, ensure and ―win‖ all the recall elections while this 
period reached its lowest for the ‗opposition‘ groupings beset by intimidation, 
imprisonment of their officials, desertion of members, internal rivalries and 
creation of splinter groups, often perceived as a ploy by the regime to destroy or 
weaken its opponents (Pettersen & Salvesen, 2006). 
One of the major strategies of control of the population, the institutions 
and the economic resources by the EPRDF and the so called partner organizations 
(referring to EPRDF affiliate political organizations in control of the regions of 
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Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz,Ogaden, and Gambella) had been blurring the distinction 
between these political organization in state power and the public/government 
institutions (Sarah, 2011). Such practices have been consequential and responsible 
for the lack of credibility and integrity of the institutions and the processes during 
previous as well as subsequent elections. While the civil service, public institutions 
and public resources were used by the EPRDF in the run-up to previous elections 
(Brechenmacher, 2017), the crisis after 2005 elections led the regime to openly 
resort to favoritism to achieve total control of the institutions and the use of public 
resources for purposes of self-aggrandizement of the ‗officials‘ and network of 
beneficiaries. It turned to recruiting new members en masse. Patron-client relations 
that spread like a wild fire within state institutions became part of the strategy of 
the EPRDF and its allies to remain in control by satisfying the interests of its 
dependent groups of beneficiaries they created. As ‗opposition‘ political 
organizations were crumbling due to the repression and internal bickering, the 
EPRDF and its affiliate or ‗partner‘ organizations have often been accused of using 
state structures and resources to help organize support bases. These include women 
and youth leagues and associations, all of which have been directly linked to local 
government structures such as the Woreda and the Kebele, the lower tiers of 
government in Ethiopia. The EPRDF and its ‗partner‘ organizations offered job 
opportunities and economic benefits, while at the same time their practices went to 
the extent of depriving the economic means of subsistence of individuals and 




On the part of political organizations of the ‗opposition‘, the period after 
the 2005 elections was characterized by the weakening of their capacity. Internal 
rivalries, which were often perceived to have been instigated by the EPRDF, were 
by far the most significant feature in the dramatic disintegration of some of the 
major opponents of the EPRDF in the immediate aftermath of the elections. Beset 
by the rivalries, the larger organizations while protesting against the actions of the 
EPRDF were clearly unable to attend to the business of politics in rapidly changing 
                                                          
2
There were practices whereby job applicants attach their EPRDF membership Identity 
Card with job application, circumstances in which business groups win government 
contracts without a formal bid process, to the detriment of real or perceived opponents. The 
former Oromo People‘s Congress now Oromo Federalist Congress over the years reported 
cases in which its members and supporters were dispossessed. And ironically nothing 
explains this situation than the experience of one high ranking official of the organization, 
who was denied the continuation of employment, academic promotion, and was evicted 





circumstances (Smith, 2007). In this regard, the crisis within the CUD leadership 
in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 in particular served as a showcase of the 
precarious state of the organizations in opposition to EPRDF. The drama unfolded 
in such a way that the CUD that amassed considerable popular support in a very 
short period of time just before the 2005 elections was being threatened with 
disintegration, despite the appeals on the part of its supporters to remain united. 
The divisions within the CUD deepened while most of its prominent figures were 
in detention during the immediate post electoral period (Amnesty International, 
2006). Although the crisis within the CUD as the major coalition that gained 
considerable support was at the center of attention after the 2005 elections, similar 
problems did happen within the UEDF as the second largest coalition in 
opposition. The crisis within the ONC, a member of UEDF coalition, for instance 
was no less dramatic. Its office was squandered and the organization disintegrated 
following the emergence of splinter group. In this respect, the major coalitions 
such as CUD and UEDF often cited the EPRDF‘s practice of supporting the less 
unpopular/splinter group within these organizations raise serious question about its 
(EPRDF) commitment for the institutionalization of genuine multiparty political 
process in Ethiopia, in practice. The intention as well as the practices on the part of 
the incumbent to systematically weaken and attack the beleaguered political 
organizations outside state power were at the center of the dramatic loss of 
integrity of electoral process and outcomes ever since. In the post 2005, the 
problems faced by ‗opposition‘ political organizations can also be explained by the 
inability of their members including their MPs to reach out to their constituencies, 
due to active state repression at the local level. Except during the electoral 
campaigns, officials of ‗opposition‘ political organization could not actively 
engage with the population at the local level, especially in rural areas, since they 
were not in a position to freely travel and discuss with their supporters, again due 
to intimidation, harassment, threats or attacks from the incumbent‘s functionaries 
at the local level virtually in all parts of the country. Consequently, apart from the 
occasional airing of their views in the parliament dominated by the EPRDF during 
the 2005-2010 period, and the use of private press, they were almost absent from 
active engagement in the political process( US State Department, 2008). 
Another blow to the multi-party political pronouncements in the aftermath 
of the 2005 period was the new state laws or legislations rubber-stamped by the 
EPRDF controlled parliament. These include a new electoral law, so called 
Charities and Societies Proclamation, the Media, Anti-terrorism legislations 
(Brechenmacher, 2017). As opposition groups and others have continued to 
complain, observers of contemporary political developments in Ethiopia viewed 
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these legislations as harbingers of the narrowing of the political space in the run up 
to the May 2010 elections, which in turn foretold the outcomes of the 2015 
elections. These legislations have been severely criticized for legalizing illegal and 
repressive practices of state authorities against their political opponents often 
treated as enemies, real or perceived. The worst manifestation of these 
controversial legislations was their use in the courts of law in the country by the 
EPRDF regime against its political opponents. The decrying of the same by 




Despite their endless predicament, ‗opposition‘ groups attempted to 
reorganize and regroup in the run up to 2010 and 2015 elections. They attempted 
to put together new coalitions to challenge the EPRDF. For instance, members of 
the former CUD and the former senior members of the EPRDF whom it expelled
4
 
established the coalition known as Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) or 
Andinet in Amharic different from the other coalition named Forum for Justice and 
Democratic Dialogue (FJDD) or commonly called Mederk in Amharic. As the 
2010 elections were approaching, the Ambassadors of the donor countries in 
Ethiopia tried to bring the EPRDF and some ‗opposition‘ political organizations 
together for roundtable discussion. The ‗opposition‘ parties were the FJDD, the 
EDP, the AEUO and the CUD. Later, the FJDD opposed to what was called 
multilateral/multi party discussions, demanding to engage the EPRDF on bilateral 
basis. The EPRDF on its part rejected the demand of the FJDD and proceeded to 
discuss with the rest of the groups. Finally, the EPRDF, the All Ethiopian Unity 
Organization /AEUO, the Ethiopian Democratic Party/EDP, and the EPRDF 
affiliated CUD signed a ―code of conduct‖ at the presence of their chairs: Meles 
Zenawi, Haile Shawul, Lidetu Ayalew, and Ayele Chamiso, respectively 
(International Press Service, 2009). During the months preceding the elections, the 
representatives of these ‗opposition‘ groups and the EPRDF debated on several 
themes on political, economic and social issues. However, unlike the 2005 
elections the debates were not given live televised coverage. Meanwhile, some of 
                                                          
3
 Ethiopian state authorities often accused organizations such as Human Rights Council 
(Ethiopian) and the Human Rights Watch as having their own political agenda, and the 
regime over the years maintained a very tense relations with US State Department due to 
the latter issuing its annual reports documenting human rights violations in Ethiopia. 
4
 Negasso Gidada and Siye Abraha were formerly high ranking EPRDF officials which 





the ‗opposition‘ in general and FJDD in particular accused the ruling EPRDF and 
its supporters for harassing their candidates in different parts of the country in the 
run up to the elections. The ruling EPRDF, nonetheless, in most cases rejected the 
allegations. Moreover, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) responded 
that the allegations were not supported by evidence. Towards the end of March 
2010, the EPRDF government and the EU had appeared to have reached an 
understanding that the latter would send its own election observation mission to 
Ethiopia, which sent about 150 observers. The African Union (AU) also fielded 
observers. However, the Carter Center, which observed the May 2005 elections, 
did not send observers. Despite their precarious conditions and the surveillance, 
FJDD, the UDJ, the EDP led by Lidetu Ayalew, the All Ethiopian Unity 
Organization (AEUO) of Engineer Hailu Shawl; the offshoots of the former CUD 
named the 'parliament group'; and the newly formed organizations such as the 
Ethiopians‘ Peace and Democracy Party (EPDP); the Ethiopian Vision Party 
(EVP); and the Ethiopian National Democratic Movement (ENDM), were among 
those that took part in the May 2010 elections (Tronvoll, 2011). 
In 2010, the EPRDF and allied groups claimed a sweeping victory, taking 
all but two of the seats for the House of Representatives. The two seats, one in 
Addis Ababa and another in Bonga, Kafa Zone, Southern Nations Nationalities and 
Peoples Region, were won by the candidate of UDJ and an independent candidate, 
respectively. 
As far as the reports of the different election observer groups were 
concerned, first the African Union Observer Mission indicated that while they 
could not observe the process during the campaigns they reiterated that the NEBE 
handled the electoral process in a professional manner. Moreover, from what it 
called polling day observation it noted that the candidates of the ruling EPRDF had 
their own observers in all polling stations visited while those of the ‗opposition‘ 
organizations did not have theirs. In citing further irregularities, the AU mission 
indicated the ballot papers lacked adequate security features and the situation was 
suitable to manipulation in that the counting procedure and enforcement of existing 
laws were lacking in some of the polling station they observed. Despite these and 
other claims of irregularities the AU Mission concluded that the 2010 elections 
were organized and carried out in accordance with ‗AU guidelines and standards 
for the conduct of democratic elections‘ (African Union Observer Mission, 2010). It 
however went on to raise some critical points particularly on the relationship 
between the ruling party EPRDF and the state/government run by it. In this regard 
the report mentioned that beyond what has been regarded as the ‗incumbency 
advantage‘, the political arena was fully in favor of the EPRDF. It cited the use of 
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state resources for the activities of the ruling EPRDF. The EU mission refrained 
from the full endorsement of the elections by claiming that ―the election does not 
meet certain international standards.‖ The EU, while it claimed the Ethiopian legal 
setting provides the scope for the conduct of genuine elections, it reiterated that the 
implementation of the laws was such that it could constrain the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms of the population. The report cited the changes the government 
instituted to the legal framework, together with other measures, have resulted in 
the narrowing of the political space (EU Observers Mission, 2010). 
To sum up, the 2010 elections were in reality held in a tense situation 
accompanied with frequent claims of the ‗opposition‘ groups, of harassment, 
intimidation and death of their members and supporters. In other words, beyond 
the measured statements of the AU and EU missions, the 2010 elections dashed 
any remaining hope of Ethiopians of various political persuasions of meaningful 
multi-party electoral contestations. This state of affairs was a continuation of the 
practices of the EPRDF, the brutal and clientelist methods with which its networks 
of functionaries worked to ―reclaim‖ the ground they lost or the ―calculated risk‖ 
they took in allowing their opponents to campaign ‗freely‘ for the 2005 elections 
(Leoul, 2006). It entailed disregarding any basic norm of modern democratic 
politics, including the use of state laws mentioned earlier against not only the 
political organizations but also members of the society perceived as its opponents. 
Members of the private media were among those who were hit hard in the run up 
to 2010 elections, the regime rooting out the few remaining private press issuing 
critical views (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
Moreover, the use of state institutions especially the courts as an 
instrument to legitimatize state repression against the political opponent of the 
EPRDF strikes at the heart of institutional crisis in contemporary Ethiopia. This 
can best be explained by the grievances of the officials of political organizations 
such as the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) during the 2010 as well as the 2015 
elections. The OFC took part in the 2015 elections and fielded relatively larger 
number of candidates from among the few beleaguered political organizations 
outside the state power (‗Refworld‘, 2014). In the run up to the elections, the OFC 
reported its candidates and supporters were intimidated and detained. It was also 
witnessed that hundreds of the candidates and observers of the ‗opposition‘ groups, 
under pressure from the regime functionaries declared, usually informally, their 
withdrawal from the process. Moreover there were reports of wide spread rigging 
where the OFC in fact claimed to have evidence such as ballot papers thrown into 







 The OFC representatives argued that they would no more take the cases to 
the courts since they claimed the results of any such court proceeding would not be 
more than rubber stamping of the regime‘s position. This shows, the level of not 
only the electoral pretensions and the lack of integrity of the process, but also how 
the integrity of long standing public institutions were being seriously undermined 
by the EPRDF in state power and its associates, using the institutions for illegal 
and narrow group interests (Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
The 2015 elections took place in conditions where all state institutions 
were mobilized to ensure a total victory for the EPRDF and its affiliates, organized 
by the electoral commission that has been simply enforcing the incumbent‘s 
position without any remorse. Under such conditions, it would have been even 
more difficult to understand how many people may have actually registered to 
vote, how many actually voted, and how many of the votes were counted properly. 
There was no way of knowing how many eligible voters did register, or did not 
vote after registering. The elections itself took place amidst reports of killing of 
opposition figures, jailing of journalists, activists, imprisonment of opposition 
observers and mass withdrawal of opposition observers (US State Department, 
2015). Overall, the 2015 electoral process that led to a claim of a 100 % electoral 
victory by the EPRDF and its partners was the logical outcome of the antagonisms, 
the degradation of basic norms of human dignity, human rights and freedoms, 
beyond the conduct of periodic elections. The whole process was one of open 
deployment of totalitarian techniques of unimaginable proportion and the near 
absolute loss of integrity of not only of the elections but also of the whole 
institutional as well the political processes of the country. To sum up the elections 
in 2010 and 2015 in particular were carried out in conditions where all state 
institutions and public resources were used to ensure EPRDF‘s and its partners‘ 
‗victory‘ in all regions of the country. 




This section is devoted to reflections on the TPLF dominated EPRDF government 
as the primary actor responsible for the running of the affairs of the state and its 
roles in being at the forefront of the propagation of the rhetoric of multi-party 
elections in Ethiopia for more than two decades. Observations from the synopsis of 
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Information from prominent Oromo Federalist Congress Official 
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  See Pausewang et al., 2002. 
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the political processes centering on the last three general elections in Ethiopia have 
shown that the positions the regime took on electoral issues as well as other 
matters affecting the population were the logical outcome of its aims, policies and 
strategies. Informed by TPLF‘s experience as an insurgent group, and bolstered by 
more than a quarter of a century of arbitrary use of state power, the EPRDF 
intensified its antagonistic relations with the various categories of the population. 
The TPLF dominated EPRDF until the 2018 dramatic events often 
reminded its supporters and opponents that it is a front of political organizations or 
groups which militarily fought and won a protracted war against the military-
socialist regime the Derg in power in Ethiopia for about 17 years. EPRDF‘s core 
group before 2018 in particular, the TPLF, came to organize itself and operated 
against the Derg in a hostile political environment in the 1970s and 1980s. As a 
consequence, while its victory over the Derg resulted in a sense of invisibility of 
its leadership and inflated self-image of its rank and file, the TPLF led EPRDF 
regime for a long time characterized the prevailing political environment in 
Ethiopia, the views of the political organizations dubbed opposition, as well as 
individual and group members of the society perceived to be  unsympathetic to its 
policies and practices in the post 1991 period, as hostile and inimical to its policies 
and strategies to achieve ―peace, democracy and development‖. Until early 2018 
dramatic events that followed a period of sustained popular protests (2014-2017), 
the EPRDF leadership could not change such an attitude towards those it often 
regard as ―anti-peace, anti-democracy and anti-development‖ forces or ―the forces 
of destruction‖. These characterizations were willfully used against political 
groupings including those it ―recognized‖ at different periods to take part in the 
political processes including in elections as discussed. No political organization or 
group capable of staging even the slightest challenge to it could have escaped such 
demonization. The same applies to any observation of dissent among individuals 
and groups within the society. The characterization of the latest deadly protests 
during 2014-2017 period as a work of ―anti-peace‖, ―anti-development‖ and ―anti-
democracy‖ or the work of ―forces of destruction‖ was part of the continuation of 
its ambitious agenda aimed to establish a total control over the Ethiopian political 
scene and its incapacity to learn lessons from its practices and misdeeds over the 
years in this respect. In doing so, it heavily relied on its past experiences in 
maintaining control of its organizational structures and deploying the same in 
controlling the population.  
The EPRDF until the 2018 dramatic changes used to assert that its policies 
and practices earned it successive victory in the post-Derg Ethiopia (Addis Raey, 





addressed long standing grievances of the various ―nations, nationalities and 
peoples‖ against the oppressive state in Ethiopia in the past. This refers to the 
reorganization of the pre-1991 Ethiopian state and the establishment of regional 
states (Kelleloch in Amharic), and in some cases ―special Zones‖ or Woreda‘s in 
the names of the ‗the peoples‘ of these regions or ‘Kelleloch’. The political 
organizations in charge of the regional states or the ‗PDOs‘ which professed to be 
the leaders of the 'peoples' would argue that the regions they are in charge of have 
achieved a measure of self-determination, though this could not be more than a 
self-serving claim. Although such forces coalescing around their expressed gains 
in terms of ―self-determination‖ have not been monolithic, they were constantly 
reminding ―the nations, nationalities and peoples‖ of their achievement in this 
regard and used this as an instrument to coax, persuade and lead the ‗peoples‘ 
along the road of ‗peace‘, ‗democracy‘ and ‗development' as defined by the 
EPRDF. Thus banking on its own archaic tradition of control and repression, the 
former EPRDF until early 2018 portrayed its image as a redeemer, that it was the 
path to political, economic and social progress, and that there would not be another 
choice or alliterative than itself. It was transmitting publicly the same message 
with a view to induce the general public hinting that the ‗opposition‘ or political 
forces outside state power should not be given a 'free ride' across the political 
landscape. This observation was further corroborated by the views of the critics 
being published following its announcement of victory after the successive 
elections. In the eyes of one of the critics, ―it saw itself as the small elite – the self-
proclaimed avant-garde – with the right and duty to direct the ‗development‘ of the 
‗broad masses‘, which meant the mass of peasant farmers' to lead them out of 
poverty‖ (Lefort, 2010). To sum-up, the practice of reminding the members, 
supporters of the EPRDF, and the general public, of the danger of allowing the 
forces perceived to be aiming to destroy what they gained hitherto, for a long 
served as its ‗winning‘ strategy.  
 Such a strategy heavily relied on the support of the individuals and groups 
that assumed to have been rallying behind TPLF-EPRDF‘s ethos of state, society 
and politics and the surging clientelist dealings in the post-Derg period responsible 
for the creation of dependent categories of beneficiaries - the ―rent seekers‖. This 
in effect means rewarding these groups by distributing the spoils, at the same time 
denying its perceived opponents any space to organize, operate and express 
themselves freely. Following from this, at one level, the post 1991 political 
development witnessed the fusion of EPRDF as political organization and the state 
in Ethiopia. For individuals and groups within the ruling EPRDF, it was therefore 
not uncommon to utilize state resources for the benefit of the organization, to 
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propagate its policies and program often confused with the interests of the public, 
thereby institutionalizing the practices of favoritism which the EPRDF itself was 
lamenting, as a political economy of ―rent seeking‖ (EU Election Observation 
Mission, 2010). Beyond what has been regarded as the incumbency advantage, 
state institutions were undoubtedly served as a locus of mobilization of support 
and of resources for the EPRDF which under a strict legal condition would have 
been unacceptable. The use of state resources for purposes other than the one for 
which they were originally intended has had a far reaching consequence for the 
elections and beyond. This ‗empowered‘ state officials‘ to embezzle and allocate 
economic resources such as finance, land and job opportunities to members and 
supporters (Human Rights Watch, 2010).This bolstered the political economy or 
context in which favoritism has got its way into the social and political life of the 
society on the one hand and the alienation and suppression of those with differing 
views on the other. Hence, it led to the intensification of the antagonism in the 
relations between the state-the EPRDF- and the various categories of the 
population.  
Beyond EPRDF‘s political repression and abuse of public institutions 
through its intrusive politico-security structures, it created new structures of 
control of individuals and groups within the society. What have been named 
―command post‖ and a ―one- to-five organizing‖ of the population were among the 
most infamous forms of coercive mechanisms that aimed for the total control of 
the population by the EPRDF regime. The official objectives of the formation of 
such structures were often presented by the EPRDF functionaries as ―the building 
of development army.‖ These means that each and every adult individual is 
required to be categorized into a group of five people, the reports of which are 
going to be sent to a central ―command post‖ (Brechenmacher, 2017). Observers 
and opposing political groups indicated that the use of these structures of control 
by the regime worked to their disadvantage, the consequence of which was the 
regime declaring a near total electoral victory in the 2010 elections. Worse still, the 
EPRDF has not been deterred from using such infamous structures of control to 
achieve the 100% electoral result in the 2015 elections. While such structures 
created a sense of invincibility and a self-deceptive image of consolidation of 





society, in reality however voter intimidation included regime functionaries‘ going 
door to door during election days to coerce reluctant residents to vote.
7
 
In the aftermath of the 2015 elections, nothing could have explained the 
pretensions of the EPRDF than the conduct of senseless meetings and 
‗negotiations‘ with pseudo opposition groups to reform the electoral system, while 
incarnating individuals and groups which relatively challenged it during the 2015 
elections (Walta Information Center, 2017). The regime was propagating the 
importance of reforming the electoral systems, including holding talks about 
proportional representation, while the people were demanding the end to killings, 
mass detentions and displacements. This was at a time human rights organizations 
have been consistently expressing their misgivings about the closure of what has 
been often characterized as the political space (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The 
protracted defamation of the private media, and the ambition to totally control all 
space of expression and association had chilling effect and did instill fear, 
fragmentation and distrust within the population until the start of sustained societal 
responses to state repression during the 2014-2017 period. In general, the points 
mentioned above are indicative of the former EPRDF regime‘s inability to learn 
any meaningful lesson from the misdeeds of its predecessors, its own totalitarian 
ambition, and practices of a quarter of a century rule of the population who have 
been left with little option than confronting it.  
To sum up, the fundamental basis of the TPLF-EPRDF regime‘s relations 
with the society in Ethiopia has been characterized by antagonism in which the 
interests of the state diverged from the needs and the aspiration of the 
overwhelming majority of the population. Not many would have taken the 
regime‘s rhetoric of ‗democracy‘, ‗peace‘ and ‗development‘, seriously in the 
aftermath of 2015 elections, which is indicative of the alienation of the 
overwhelming majority of the population from the political as well as the policy 
processes of the regime. Ironically it was EPRDF‘s rhetoric and practices about 
‗development‘ which in the eyes of members of the population amounted to land 
grabbing, that resulted in a mass protest that rattled the regime and forced it to 
make concessions by the end of 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2010). As discussed 
in the next section, mass protests especially during 2015-2017 were not just 
spontaneous reactions to state repression; they were the consequences of prolonged 
antagonism in which the regime disregarded basic norms of human dignity, 
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freedoms and the rule of law, in addition to its unwillingness to conduct free and 
fair elections. 
 
Constraints to Political Transformation & Multi-party Elections in the 
Post 2014-2017 Protests 
Central to the political dynamics of change since early 2018 was the popular 
protests that shook the core of the regime led by Hailemariam Desalegn. The 
widespread protests carried out on a sustained basis the Oromia and the Amara 
regions were consequential in forcing the regime to make concessions. As 
repressive state actions that involved arbitrary killings, torture and mass detentions 
continued, the protests became even more persistent and exhibited some level of 
coordination. More and more people from the different Oromia regions and later 
the Amhara regions of the country have been involved and the population in these 
parts of the country did bear the brunt of the repression born out of desperation of 
those in control of state power. Activists from abroad played significant role in 
galvanizing and emboldening the protests at home amidst the crackdown. The day-
to-day activities of state institutions, travels from the capital Addis Ababa to 
different regions of the country were disrupted; rioters attacked and in some cases 
burnt down properties (BBC, Aug. 22, 2016). In response, the state military and 
security forces killed hundreds of people, injured and detained tens of thousands. 
Towards the end of 2017 it became apparent that the regime was not in a position 
to sustain the status quo in repressing the population. The pressures from within 
and outside the country led to the resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn. Abiy 
Ahmed from the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO) wing of the 
EPRDF took the prime ministerial position in April 2018, followed by dramatic 
events and promises which among others include the promises for the creation of a 
political environment whereby free and fair elections could be held, in anticipation 
of the general elections in 2020. 
Political prisoners were released in thousands, armed political 
organizations in exile have returned to take part in peaceful political struggles, 
hundreds if not thousands of people who were in exile have been able to return or 
visit the country
8
. Abiy Ahmed‘s administration took initiatives towards the 
reconciliation of deeply divided religious communities, held meetings in Europe 
and America with members of the Ethiopian emigrant population, some of the 
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events which saw the largest number of people attending in the presence of the 
Ethiopian government official in the post 1991 period. A modicum of press 
freedom and of expression restored thanks to the sacrifices paid by members of the 
society who fought the naked repression of the state and forced the EPRDF regime 
to make concessions. Significant numbers of women have been assigned to 
ministerial positions and some individuals perceived to be outside the traditional 
EPRDF circles have been appointed to various positions. The archetype political 
control on public institutions, groups and private lives of individuals has been 
eased, at least for now. The rapprochement with Eritrea has been positively 
received at home and abroad and relations with Middle Eastern countries such as 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have been on the upbeat (US Institute of 
Peace, 2018). 
Since April 2018 some of the elements of the political rhetoric of the 
EPRDF led by the administration of Abiy Ahmed have changed. The political 
language has become one of promoting unity than harping on EPRDF‘s divisive 
rhetoric‘s ―anti-peace‖, ―anti-development‖, ―anti-democracy‖ which have been 
replaced by the language of Medemer or unity. Given the former EPRDF‘s 
language of antagonism, the change of tone seems to have brought significant 
relief to the public. The practice of branding the regime‘s perceived political 
opponents, particularly supporters, members and officials of political organizations 
as ―anti-peace‖, ―anti-democracy‖ and ―anti-development forces‖ has been 
changed to ―competing political parties.‖ The constant intimidation and harassment 
of officials of political organizations ended and previously armed political 
organizations returned from Eritrea are reportedly opening offices in different parts 
of the country, despite tensions in the relationships between the new ruling 
grouping of EPRDF and some of those who returned from Eritrea in particular.
9
 
This experience of relief during the last one year period has not been without 
challenges, however. Distrust of the EPRDF, the activities of state authorities and 
the political process in general, fragmentation of political organizations and 
political ideas, and the erosion of the rule of law, are identified as some of the 
major challenges in the present context with far- reaching implication for the future 
of multi-party politics and transformations in state-society relations in Ethiopia. 
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As mentioned above, trust in the political process led by the EPRDF, 
fragmentation of political organizations and political ideas or views they espouse 
and the erosion of the rule law are among the major challenges in the present 
context. First of all, the distrust among the public as well as political organizations, 
of the EPRDF as political organization, its policies and practices remains 
pervasive. The legacy of state repression and arbitrary exercise of power have 
continued to cast shadow over the relative sense of relief felt among the wider 
public following a period of mass protests resulting in some of the positive 
developments mentioned earlier. It is also important to mention that hundreds of 
thousands of people have been displaced from different parts of the country both 
before and after 2018 (ReliefWeb, Sept. 12, 2018). Such conditions and 
uncertainties feed into past and recent experience of the people in distrusting those 
in power. Put differently, the major political events or changes since 2018 while 
addressing some of the problems, did not tip the balance in favor of the people to 
have control over political affairs of the country, their aspirations and demands for 
freedom, the rule of law and human dignity and human rights. This means that 
while one of the central political issues raised since the changes in early 2018 has 
been transition to democratic rule through the mechanisms of free and fair 
elections, conditions of distrust continue to prevail including skepticism about the 
future of free and fair election in this country. 
From economic point of view, the much talked about developmental state 
economy in reality amounted to the domination of the economy by individuals and 
groups affiliated with the regime dominated by the TPLF. The government was 
using extra-legal means to benefit members of the regime and their dependent 
beneficiaries, networks extending to the local level in the society, while at the 
same time denying the basic means of subsistence of the perceived opponents. As 
mentioned, protests which started in 2014 were primarily initiated by what local 
people understood as state-sponsored dispossessions of their economic means of 
subsistence, notably land, contrary to the much proclaimed ‗developmentalism‘ of 
the EPRDF regime, that received acclamation from its  local and global clients and 
patrons before 2018. Thus, the cumulative effect of controlling, co-opting state and 
societal institutions and arbitrary use of state power left members of society with 
no options than facing the regime head-on, conducting sustained protest led by 
individuals and groups echoing the voices of the highly disaffected population 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017). In other words, while the mass protests of 2014-
2017 was the continuation and outcome of the accumulated effects of a quarter of a 
century of EPRDF‘s rule, mismanagement, and pseudo reforms including ―decades 





administration working to restore trust in state institutions that have long been 
eroded is proving to be challenging (Pausewang et al., 2002). Put differently, while 
it seems that the reform initiatives have been viewed positively, and expected to 
improve some aspects of the relations between the regime and the population, and 
revitalize institutions (Yeraswork, 2006), if and when carried out on a sustainable 
basis, the backlog of experience of controlling, co-opting and infiltrating 
institutions, including political organizations, traditional societal institutions 
inimical to the ideals of modern democratic practices including free and fair 
election, are militating against the reform initiatives as current observations 
suggest. Moreover, while the reform initiatives have been positively received by 
large section of the population, there has also been widespread feeling among the 
population of continuing lack of responsiveness, accountability, transparency of 
state officials or institutions at the national and sub-national levels. Such problems 
have been the sources of misgivings and in some cases protests held by members 
of the population in different parts of the country since 2018. In general, the lack 
of trust on the part of the general population of the EPRDF as political 
organization (not necessarily all individual officials at the forefront of the reform 
initiatives currently), their relations with state institutions at various levels will 
remain a major obstacle in visualizing a new framework of politics in which, it is 
hoped, free and fair elections may be held in the near future. 
The second major constraint in thinking through the prospect of 
meaningful multi-party political dispensations or multi-party politics is the 
fragmentation of political organizations and political views and ideas. Outdated 
methods of political control and repression carried out by the EPRDF regime and 
prolonged stay in power contributed to the fragmentation of political organizations 
and opinions degenerating into sectarian politics. In addition to EPRDF‘s own 
divisive maneuvers during the successive elections discussed earlier, the Kellels or 
Regions controlled by EPRDF ‗partner‘ organization in Ogaden, Afar, 
Benishangul Gumuz, and Gambella served the purpose of preventing opposition 
political organizations from taking part in political activities in these regions 
including during periods of elections (Zemelak, 2017). EPRDF‘s strategy of 
control went to the extent of discrediting political organizations which professed to 
have national platforms by demonizing them as lackeys of those accused of 
pursuing old unitarist political model of the country, besides those it often branded 
as ―narrow nationalists‖- terms frequently used against its real or perceived 
opponents. 
Besides, the formation and function of political organizations including 
those that have taken part in electoral processes so far are not based on shared 
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notions of political ideals in Ethiopia at the national level. The fragmentation of the 
organizations and their views extend to the lack of consensus on the meanings of 
citizenship, collective and individual rights, the status of some of the most 
controversial provisions in the constitution, the nature of borders and solutions to 
territorial claims and counter claims along the borders of the post 1991 Kelleloch 
or ―National Regional States.‖ There are extreme positions in which some political 
organizations identifying themselves with one or another categories of the 
population in the context of the prevailing politicization of identities on one hand 
and those full of nostalgia of the unitarist model of state and government of the 
past and the gulf between the two animating tensions among the organizations call 
themselves ‗front‘, ‗movement‘, ‗party‘, etc. 
Moreover, the prevailing political thinking and practices of deploying the 
―language of identity‖ to exploit the presumed differences among the diverse 
population as an instrument of political power by the former EPRDF regime is 
being imitated by various individuals, networks and groups espousing parochial 
political agendas. In the present context, such regressive practices have the 
potential to impact not just the political reform initiatives and the activities of 
political organizations but also the efforts aimed towards building political 
solidarity among the diverse population as evidenced by societal responses to state 
repression during the recent protests. There are growing fears that the people 
assumed to be not ―natives‖ to certain regions of the country may not be able to 
feel free to participate in political activities in the regions, and political 
organizations outside state power may not be able to move freely and seek support 
in different parts of the country (US Department of State, 2007). In a nutshell, the 
legitimization of political organizations and ideas along sectarian lines and the 
‗instrumentalization‘ of the identities of one or another of the constituent 
population of the country for seizing, maintaining and use of state power has had a 
long term impact in reinforcing the sense of alienation, fear and distrust within the 
population experienced during much of EPRDF‘s rule.  
Beyond the damage that has been done already largely due to the former 
EPRDF‘s antagonistic approaches to politics, political groupings in and outside 
state power as well as newly emerging groups are being indulged in the practices 
of interpretations of political ideas and terminologies in a manner intensifying the 
fragmentation and disunity and engage each other on sectarian or parochial lines. 
The pervasive use of terms such as ―nation‖ or ―biher” in Amharic without 
adequate understanding of such controversial notions will have implications and 
will continue to raise serious questions, including questions about the prospect for 





therefore not surprising that currently some political organizations and their 
supporters and political activists, knowingly or unknowingly, are attempting to 
expand the scope of their parochial political attitudes and practices to create 
tensions and conflicts among groups within the wider society risking the further 
fragmentation that would put in doubt the feasibility of free and fair elections 
during the anticipated 2020 general elections, at least. 
 To sum up on the issue of fragmentation of political organizations and 
political ideas, the diverging interest of those in control of the state‘s political, 
economic and social development policies and practices for a long time has been 
the outcomes of political antagonism including the deliberate distortions of 
political concepts to fit the purposes of the narrow interests of the EPRDF regime, 
its beneficiaries, being imitated by other groups organized along sectarian lines. 
Consequently, the use of extremely divergent political positions and 
pronouncements by officials, members or supporters of the various political 
organizations in and outside state power as means of political mobilization and the 
route to power will have a significant bearing on the effort aimed towards the 
creation of a balanced context including the creation of common understanding 
about the imperatives of a genuine multi-party elections as the basis of assuming 
political offices in the future. It is therefore not surprising that those members of 
the public who have been aware of the divisive effect of the fragmentation of 
political organizations and their rhetoric have ironically been calling for unity 
among political organizations. The most recent example has been the appeal of 
members of the Oromo community for the ―unity of‖ political organizations, 
professing to stand for the interests of members of this community. It seems that 
the fear of members of the community became a reality when the distrust between 
the OLF faction led by Daud Ibsa and EPRDF‘s regional block, the Oromo 
Democratic Party (ODP) (the former OPDO) entered into armed confrontations 
resulting in loss of civilian lives, closure of schools, bank robberies and burnings 
of public offices during the late 2018, especially in western Wollega region. 
Therefore, the question that remains is whether the EPRDF and other political 
organizations or groups have learnt any lesson from the 25 years of fragmentation 
and disunity characteristic of state-society relations of antagonism explained in this 
paper. 
Third, one of the major challenges in conducting genuine multi-party 
elections and in the overall improvement of state-society relations in Ethiopia is 
the erosion of the rule of law. The malpractices extend beyond the rampant use of 
state laws as instrument of repression in pre-electoral, electoral and post electoral 
periods widely documented by human rights organizations and others who 
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conducted studies on this particular register of the regime. One of the major 
negative lessons of the 2005 elections has been new state laws which restricted and 
curtailed basic rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and groups in 
society. In a bid to discourage or punish individuals and organizations that were 
perceived to have been sympathetic to its opponents, EPRDF came up with what 
were regarded as civil society, media and later anti-terrorism laws (Hussein, 2017). 
Using the ―legislations‖ as instruments of political repression and the use of the 
courts of law as political instrument severely impacted popular perception of laws 
and legal institutions with long lasting repercussions (Open Democracy, Nov. 
2012). Among others, the anti-terrorism legislation was one of the most unpopular 
legislation since the regime used it widely as a tool to punish its political 
opponents and to remain in control indefinitely. The use of such legislations led to 
severe criticisms of the regime, and its practices of total control of state institutions 
including the judiciary, the co-optations of societal institutions (including those 
working in the domains of customary laws - traditional as well as religious 
institutions) will continue to have long term repercussions. 
Thus, some aspects of the recent initiatives toward the restoration of the 
rule of law are encouraging, and appointment of new prosecutor and Supreme 
Court judges, new electoral board members, establishing national reconciliation 
commissions are positive gestures. However, these do not seem to have immediate 
impact on the situation on the ground and perhaps that is why the people must 
continue to appeal to the current administration for the restoration of the rule of 
law, as a matter of priority. This means that it would be difficult to anticipate a 
major change in the political landscape including in the fields of electoral politics, 
without genuinely working on the restoration of the rule of law whereby people 
can freely express themselves, make associations and achieve a measure of 
economic freedom, peace, and sustainable development under the rules of law. 
Moreover, this is in as long as addressing the daunting task of the restoration of the 
rule of law is understood to contribute towards the creation of an enabling context 
for multi-party political processes as essential component of democratic politics in 
the future. To sum up, recent experiences suggest that addressing problematic 
issues in regards to the restoration of the rule of law, overcoming the challenges of 
political fragmentation and the lack of trust in the political process in improving 
the prospects of democratic politics would require more than the good will of 
political groups or organizations and political reform initiatives led by state 
officials. More than anything else, the situation requires reflections on the 





which are human dignity, human rights and freedom, the rule of law, justice, as  
briefly discussed next, in the conclusion. 
 
Conclusion: the Quest for Political Community in Ethiopia 
The analyses on the topics of electoral politics and multi-partism and the nature of 
state-society relations in Ethiopia indicate that there has been fundamental 
divergence in the relations between the various categories of the society in 
Ethiopia and the regime led by the EPRDF that used various strategies of control 
and repression to prolong its rule for more than a quarter of a century. Its strategies 
of power and control led to fragmentation, fear, distrust, and the eventual 
alienation of the population from the political process and reduced its rhetoric of 
multi-party elections to nothing more than pretentions referred to in this paper as 
multi-partism. The regime‘s rhetoric of multi-party democracy that lasted for more 
than two decades was discredited beyond doubt following the 2010 and 2015 
elections. Ironically, such a dire situation has on occasions been accompanied with 
false acclamation from the outside, when the regime declared a 100 % electoral 
victory.
10
 EPRDF practices which led to the lack of respect for the dignity, the 
rights and freedoms of members of the society, their voice in the political process 
eroded the people‘s sense of meaningful citizenship, and threatened to render 
meaningless the notion of the will of the people.  
Thus, one could observe the circumstances in which nothing would have 
changed the situation than the coming together of members of the disaffected 
population to confront the repression. While the disunity and fragmentation caused 
for more than 25 years of EPRDF rule will continue to raise questions about the 
viability of political community in Ethiopia at the national level, it appeared that 
the people‘s realization of their own determination to stand in solidarity with one 
another served as a watershed in response to state repression, the regime‘s 
arbitrariness, lack of accountability, lack of meaningful participatory political 
processes. In other words, the people‘s demand of dignity, freedom and the rule of 
law that animated the protest resulting in a modicum of change since 2018, has 
created some signs for the creation of political solidarity as key element in the 
rethinking of political community in Ethiopia. The central features of those 
protests which led to some level of relief for about a year now arose from the effort 
                                                          
10
 The Former US President Barack Obama‘s description of the EPRDF government after 
the May 2015 elections in Ethiopia, as ―democratically elected government‖ is the most 
dramatic of all the uncalled-for acclamations.  
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made by the affected population to stand together against state repression. The 
people in the regions where state repression had been relentless, before and after 
the successive elections, and where ‗opposition‘ political organizations put 
relatively stronger challenges to the regime
11
, were at the forefront of the protests 
and borne the brunt in terms of the death of hundreds of people during the protests. 
Put differently, while repressive regimes and their proponents have always been 
skeptical about the people‘s capacity to stand together and respond to the 
repressive actions of the state, the protest since 2014 that created a shockwave 
within the political order confirmed people in unison can make a difference.  
The protests thus served as a ―relational‖ moment for the ones 
marginalized population to rise to the occasion and take actions directed towards 
ending state repression. During the protests, it was observed that more repression 
on the part of the state meant even more emboldened actions accompanied with 
some level of coordination and solidarity including attempts to build trust across 
the political divides. The people who are at the forefront were persistent in their 
demand, namely the demand  to end the killings,  state-sponsored dispossession, 
demand for release of political prisoners, political freedom, restoration of the rule 
of law, dignity, accountability and justice. More important, it put the regime on the 
defensive which at times was claiming the protests were without ―owners‖ or 
‗leaders‘, which was  indicative of the fact that the unfolding of the protests were 
essentially mass based, even though there were encouragements and activism that 
attempted to provide guidance from outside the country in particular. This is an 
indication of a modicum of change, a ‗relational moment‘, of the people‘s capacity 
to create space of discussion, association and solidarity even in conditions where 
the political environment was openly repressive. This underwrites an important 
point that was neglected before, i.e. the possibility of a community of people 
overcoming fragmentation, mistrust, and fears of the state, waging their struggle 
with determination and coordination. 
The promise of the community of people standing in solidarity with one 
another, working to transform the relations with repressive state machinery is not 
easy; it requires continuous engagement in the creation of the space for expression, 
association, and discussion on what to do next in politics, despite the ongoing 
challenges. Such engagement need to be visualized as long term project in dealing 
with the challenge beyond the times of elections and protests, requiring the 
                                                          
11
 These arguably refer to West Shoa, Wollega, and Western Arsi, West and East Hararge 






understanding of the ongoing dynamics manifesting itself in parochial attitudes and 
practices which appear to be pervasive even after the reforms have been initiated. 
Overcoming the experiences of fragmentation, dealing with the divisive and 
sectarian rhetoric of political groups in and outside the state power, regressive calls 
of self-appointed activities sowing the seeds of discord are the obstacles which 
stand in the way of the quest for a viable political community in Ethiopia. It is 
primarily a quest for space of association, expression and solidarity which nurtures 
human dignity, human rights and freedom, rule of law and justice, fostering 
meaningful sense of belonging and citizenship in a ‗relational‘- ethical realm. 
Thus the future of a genuine multi-party electoral dispensations as an 
important component of democratic politics in the future will by and large depend 
on the capacity and effort among the diverse people of the country to engage in 
inclusive dialogue, stand in solidarity with one another for the common causes of 
dignity, freedoms and the rule of law, and justice, without which meaningful 
elections and the overall transformation of politics would remain unattainable. 
Political reform initiatives and attempts to reform the once infamous electoral 
board and the ongoing conduct of dialogue with the various political organizations 
may be viewed as positive steps to improve the conditions in which future 
elections can be held in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the issue of meaningful electoral 
process to conduct genuine multi-party elections and resolving some of the most 
intractable political problems faced by the people will be challenging for the years 
to come, and, given the experiences and the current dynamics, it may not augur 
well for the outcomes, including the outcome of upcoming 2020 general elections 
the successful or timely conduct of which in itself is in doubt. Without being 
overly prescriptive, more than anything, the situation requires the recognition of 
the role of the various categories of the population to come together and stand in 
solidarity for the common purposes and goals of a political community the 
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